Real-world graph applications, such as advertisements and product recommendations make pro ts based on accurately classify the label of the nodes. However, in such scenarios, there are high incentives for the adversaries to a ack such graph to reduce the node classi cation performance. Previous work on graph adversarial a acks focus on modifying existing graph structures, which is infeasible in most real-world applications. In contrast, it is more practical to inject adversarial nodes into existing graphs, which can also potentially reduce the performance of the classi er.
INTRODUCTION
Graphs, in which nodes and their a ributes denote real-world entities (e.g., individuals) and links encode di erent types of relationships (e.g., friendship) between entities, are ubiquitous in many domains, such as social networks, electronic commerce, politics, counter-terrorism, among others. Many real-world applications e.g., targeting advertisements and product recommendations, rely on accurate methods for node classi cation [1, 4] . However, in high-stakes scenarios, such as political campaigns and e-commerce, there are signi cant political, nancial, or other incentives for adversaries to a ack such graphs to achieve their goals. For example, political adversaries may want to propagate fake news in social medias to damage an opponent's electoral prospects [2] . e success of such a ack depends on a large extent of the adversaries' ability to misclassify the graph classi er. § Corresponding Author. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. Recent works [12, 32, 35] have shown that even the state-of-theart graph classi ers are susceptible to a acks which aim at adversely impacting the node classi cation accuracy. Because graph classiers are trained based on node a ributes and the link structure in the graph, an adversary can a ack the classi er by poisoning the graph data used for training the classi er. Such an a ack can be (i) node speci c, as in the case of a target evasion a ack [32, 35] that is designed to ensure that the node classi er is fooled into misclassifying a speci c node; or (ii) non-target [12] , as in the case of a acks that aim to reduce the accuracy of node classi cation across a graph. As shown by [12, 32, 35] , both node speci c and non-target a acks can be executed by selectively adding fake (adversarial) edges or selectively remove (genuine) edges between the existing nodes in the graph so as to adversely impact the accuracy of the resulting graph classi ers. However, the success of such a ack strategy requires that the adversary is able to manipulate the connectivity between the nodes in the graph, e.g., Facebook, which requires breaching the security of the requisite subset of members (so as to modify their connectivity), or breaching the security of the database that stores the graph data, or manipulating the requisite members into adding or deleting their links to other selected members. Consequently, such a ack strategy is expensive for the adversary to execute without being caught.
In this paper, we introduce a novel graph non-target a ack aimed at adversely impacting the accuracy of graph classi er. We describe a node injection poisoning a ack procedure that provides an effective way to a ack a graph by introducing fake nodes with fake labels that link to genuine nodes so as to poison the graph data. Unlike previously studied graph a acks, the proposed strategy enables an a acker to boost the node misclassi cation rate without changing the link structure between the existing nodes in the graph. For example, in Facebook network, an a acker could simply creates fake member pro les and manipulate real members to link to the fake member pro les, so as to change the predicted labels of some of the real Facebook members. Such a ack is easier and less expensive to execute compared to those that require manipulating the links between genuine nodes in the graph.
Establishing links between an injected adversarial (fake) node to existing nodes in the original graph or to other injected adversarial nodes is a non-trivial task. As shown in Figure 1 , both the a ackers in (b) and (c) want to inject two fake nodes into the clean graph in (a). However, it is obviously presented in Figure 1 that the "smart a acker" who carefully designs the links and label of the injected nodes could be er poison the graph than the "dummy a ack" who generates the links and labels at random. We also observe that such task is naturally formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP) and reinforcement learning algorithms, e.g., Q-learning [30] o ers a natural framework for solving such problems [9, 27, 31] . However, a representation that directly encodes graph structure as states and addition and deletion of links leads to an intractable MDP. Hence, we adopt a hierarchical Q-learning network (HQN) to learn and exploit a compact yet accurate encoding of the Q function to manipulate the labels of adversarial nodes as well as their connectivity to other nodes. We propose a framework named NIPA to execute the Node Injection Poisoning A ack. Training the NIPA presents some non-trivial challenges: (i) NIPA has to sequentially guide fake nodes to introduce fake links to other (fake or genuine) nodes and then adversarially manipulate the labels of fake nodes; (ii) e reward function needs to be carefully designed to steer the NIPA to execute e ective NIA.
e key contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We study the novel non-target graph node injection a ack problem to adversely impact the accuracy of a node classier without manipulating the link structure of the original graph.
• We propose a new framework NIPA, a hierarchical Qlearning based method that can be executed by an adversary to e ectively perform the poisoning a ack. NIPA successfully addresses several non-trivial challenges presented by the resulting reinforcement learning problem.
• We present results of experiments with several real-world graphs data that show that NIPA outperforms the state-ofthe-art non-target a acks on graph.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 formally de nes the non-target node injection poisoning a ack problem. Section 4 gives the details of the proposed NIPA. Section 5 shows empirical evaluation with discussion and section 6 presents the conclusion and future work.
RELATED WORK
Our study falls in the general area of data poisoning a ack [6] , which aims at a ack the model by corrupting the training data. Data poisoning a acks have been extensively studied for the non graphstructured data, including supervised learning [5, 20, 23] , unsupervised feature selection [33] , and reinforcement learning [16, 18, 21] etc. However, li le a ention has been given to understanding how to poison the graph structured data.
Adversarial Attacks on Graphs
e previous works [17, 28] have shown the intriguing properties of neural networks as they are "vulnerable to adversarial examples" in computer vision domain. For example, in [17] , the authors show that some deep models are not resistant to adversarial perturbation and propose the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate the adversarial image samples to a ack such models. Not only in computer vision domain, recently such "intriguing properties" have also been observed in the graph mining domain. e research communities show that graph neural networks are also vulnerable to adversarial a acks. Ne ack [35] is one of the rst methods that perturbs the graph data to perform poisoning/training-time a ack on GCN [19] model. RL-S2V [12] adopts reinforcement learning for evasion/testing-time a ack on graph data. Di erent from previous methods, [10] and [32] focus on poison a ack by gradient information. [10] a acks the graph in embedding space by iteratively modifying the connections of nodes with maximum absolute gradient. [32] proposes to a ack the graph structured data by use the integrated gradients approximating the gradients computed by the model and performs perturbation on data by ipping the binary value. [36] modi es the training data and performs poisoning attacks via meta-learning. ough these graph adversarial a acks are e ective, they focus on manipulating links among existing nodes in a graph, which are impractical as these nodes/individuals are not controlled by the a acker.
Our framework is inherently di erent from existing work. Instead of manipulating links among existing nodes, our framework inject fake nodes to the graph (say fake accounts in Facebook), and manipulate the label and links of fake nodes to poison the graph.
Reinforcement Learning in Graph
Reinforcement learning(RL) has achieved signi cant successes in solving challenging problems such as continuous robotics control [26] and playing atari games [24] . However, there has been li le previous work exploring RL in graph mining domain. Graph Convolutional Policy Network (GCPN) [34] is one of the works which adopts RL in graph mining. e RL agent is trained on the chemistry aware graph environment and learns to generate molecular graph. [13] is another work which de nes chemical molecular reaction environment and trains the RL agent for predicting products of the chemical reaction.
e most similar work to ours is RL-S2V [12] which adopts RL for target evasion a ack on graph by manipulating the links among existing nodes; while we investigate RL for non-target injection poisoning a ack and manipulate labels and links of fake nodes.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we formally de ne the problem we target. We begin by introducing the de nition of semi-supervised node classi cation as we aim to poison the graph for manipulating label classi cation of graph classi ers. Note that the proposed framework is a general framework which can also be used to poison the graph for other tasks. We leave other tasks as future work.
De nition 3.1. (Semi-Supervised Node Classi cation) Let G = (V , E, X ) be an a ributed graph, where V = { 1 , . . . n } denotes the node set, E ⊆ V × V means the edge set and X represents the nodes features. T = { t 1 , . . . , t n } is the labeled node set and U = { u 1 , . . . , u n } is the unlabeled node set with T ∪ U = V . Semi-supervised node classi cation task aims at correctly labeling the unlabeled nodes in U with the graph classi er C.
In semi-supervised node classi cation task, the graph classi er C(G) which learns the mapping V →L aims to correctly assign the label to node j ∈ U with aggregating the structure and feature information. e classi er C is parameterized by θ and we denote the classi er as C θ . For simplicity of notations, we use C θ (G) i as the classier prediction on i and T i as the ground truth label of i . In the training process, we aim to learn the optimal classi er C with the corresponding parameter θ L de ned as following:
where L is the loss function such as cross entropy. To a ack the classi er, there are mainly two a acking se ings including poisoning/training-time a ack and evasion/testing-time a ack.
In poisoning a acks, the classi er C uses the poisoned graph for training while in evasion a ack, adversarial examples are included in testing samples a er C is trained on clean graph. In this paper, we focus on non-targeted graph poisoning a ack problem where the a acker A poisons the graph before training time to reduce the performance of graph classi er C over unlabeled node set U.
De nition 3.2.
(Graph Non-Targeted Poisoning A ack) Given the a ributed graph G = (V , E, X ), the labeled node set T , the unlabeled node set U and the graph classi er C, the a acker A aims to modify the graph G within a budget ∆ to reduce the accuracy of classi er C on U.
As the a acking process is supposed to be unnoticeable, the number of allowed modi cations of a acker A on G is constrained by the budget ∆. Based on the problem, we propose the node injection poisoning method to inject a set of adversarial nodes V A into the node set V to perform graph non-targeted poisoning a ack.
De nition 3.3. (Node Injection Poisoning A ack) Given the clean graph G = (V , E, X ), the a acker A injects the poisoning node set V A with its adversarial features X A and labels T A into the clean node set V . A er injecting V A , the a ack A creates adversarial edges E A ⊆ V A ×V A ∪V A ×V to poison G. G = (V , E , X ) is the poisoned graph where V = V ∪V A , E = E∪E A , X = X ⊕X A with ⊕ is append operator and T is the labeled set with T = T ∪ T A . In the poisoning a ack, the graph classi er is trained on poisoned graph G .
With the above de nitions and notations, the objective function for the non-targeted node injection poisoning a ack is de ned as:
Here U j represents the label of the unlabeled node j . If the a acker has the ground truth for the unlabeled data (unlabel is to end-user in this case), then U is ground truth label; if a acker doesn't have the access to the ground true, then U is predicted by graph classi er trained on clean graph. 1(s) is the indicator function with 1(s) = 1 if s is true and 0 otherwise. e a acker maximizes the prediction error for the unlabeled nodes in U as in Eq. (2), subject to two constraints. e constrain (3) enforces the classi er is learned from the poisoned graph G . and constrain (4) restricts the modi cations of adversarial edges by the a acker in the budget ∆ In this paper, we use the Graph Convolution Network (GCN) [19] as our graph classi er C to illustrate our framework as it is widely adopted graph neural model for node classi cation task. In the convolutional layer of GCN, nodes rst aggregate information from its neighbor nodes followed by the non-linear transformation such as ReLU. e equation for a two-layer GCN is de ned as:
whereÂ =D − 1 2ÃD − 1 2 denotes the normalized adjacency matrix, A = A + I N denotes adding the identity matrix I N to the adjacent matrix A.D is the diagonal matrix with on-diagonal element aŝ D ii = jÃi j . W (0) and W (1) are the weights of rst and second layer of GCN, respectively. ReLU(0, a) = max(0, a) is adopted. e loss function L in GCN is cross entropy.
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
To perform the non-target node injecting poisoning a ack, we propose to solve the optimization problem in Eq.(2) via deep reinforcement learning. Compared with directly optimizing the adjacency matrix with traditional matrix optimization techniques, the advantages of adopting deep reinforcement learning are two folds: (i) Adding edges and changing labels of fake nodes are naturally sequential decision making process. us, deep reinforcement learning is a good t for the problem; (ii) e underlying structures of graphs are usually highly nonlinear [29] , which adds the non-linearity to the decision making process. e deep non-linear neural networks of the Q network could be er capture the graph non-linearity and learn the semantic meaning of the graph for making be er decisions.
An illustration of the proposed framework is shown in Figure 2 . e key idea of our proposed framework is to train the deep reinforcement learning agent which could iteratively perform actions to poison the graph. e actions includes adding adversarial edges and modifying the labels of injected nodes. More speci cally, the agent needs to rstly pick one node from injected nodes set V A and select another node from poisoned node set V to add the adversarial edge, and modify the label of the injected nodes to a ack the classi er C. We design reinforcement learning environment and reward according to the optimization function to achieve this.
Next, we describe the details of the proposed method and present the RL environment design, the deep Q
Attacking Environment
We model the proposed poisoning a ack procedure as a Finite Horizon Markov Decision Process (S, A, P, R, γ ). e de nition of the MDP contains state space S, action set A, transition probability P, reward R, discount factor γ .
4.1.1 State. e state s t contains the intermediate poisoned graph G t and labels information T A t of the injected nodes at the time t. To capture the highly non-linear information and the nonEuclidean structure of the poisoned graph G t , we embed G t as e(G t ) with aggregating the graph structure information via designed graph neural networks. e(T A t ) encodes the adversarial label e details of the state representation is described in following subsection.
Since in the injection poisoning environment, the node set V remains identical thus the DRL agent performs poisoning actually on the edge set E t .
Action.
In the poisoning a ack environment, the agent is allowed to (1) add the adversarial edges within the injected nodes V A or between the injected nodes and the clean nodes; (2) modify the adversarial labels of the injected nodes. However, directly adding one adversarial edge has O(|V A | 2 + |V A | * |V |) possible choices and modifying the adversarial label of one injected node requires O(|L|) space where |L| is the number of label categories.
us, performing one action that contains both adding an adversarial edge and changing the label of a node has search space as O(|V A | * |V | * |L|), which is extremely expensive especially in large graphs. us, we adopt hierarchical action to decompose such action and reduce the action space to enable e cient exploration inspired by previous work [12] .
As shown in Figure 2 , in NIPA, the agent rst performs an action a (1) to select one injected node from V A . e agent then picks another node from the whole node set V via action a (2) . e agent connects these two selected nodes to forge the adversarial edge. Finally, the agent modi es the label of the selected fake node through action a 3 . By such hierarchical action a = (a (1) , a (2) , a (3) ), the action space is reduced from O(|V A | * |V | * |L|) to O(|V A | + |V | + |L|). With the hierarchy action a = (a (1) , a (2) , a (3) ), the trajectory of the proposed MDP is (s 0 , a
4.1.3 Policy network. As both of previous work [12] and our our preliminary experiments show that Q-learning works more stable than other policy optimization methods such as Advantage Actor Critic, we focus on modeling policy network with Q-learning. Q-learning is an o -policy optimization which ts the Bellman optimality equation as:
e greedy policy to select the action a t with respect to Q * is:
As we explain in the above subsection that performing one poisoning action requires searching in O(|V A | * |V | * |L|) space and we perform hierarchical actions other than one action, we cannot directly follow the policy network in Eq.(6) and Eq.(7). Here, we adopt hierarchical Q function for the actions and we propose the hierarchical framework which integrates three DQNs. e details of the proposed DQNs are presented in following section.
Reward.
As the RL agent is trained to enforce the misclassi cation of the graph classi er C, we need to design the reward accordingly to guide the agent. e reasons why we need to design novel reward function other than using the widely adopted binary sparse rewards are two folds: (1) as our trajectory in the a acking environment is usually long, we need the intermediate rewards which give feedback to the RL agent on how to improve its performance on each state; (2) di erent from the target a ack that we know whether the a ack on one targeted node is success or not, we perform the non-target a ack over graph thus accuracy is not binary e reward of the current state and actions for the agent is designed according to the poisoning objective function shown in Eq. (2). For each state s t , we de ne the a ack success rate A t as:
Here D is the validation set used to compute the reward. Note that the C θ S is not the graph classi er C that evaluates the nal classi cation accuracy. It represents the simulated graph classier designed by a acker to acquire the state and actions reward. However, directly using the success rate A t as the reward would increase the instability of training process since the accuracy might not di er a lot for two consecutive state. In this case, we design the guiding binary reward r t to be one if the action a t = (a (1) t , a (2) t , a (3) t ) could reduce the accuracy of a acker's simulated graph classi er C θ S , and to be negative one vice versa.
e design the guiding reward r t is de ned as follows:
Our preliminary experimental results show that such guiding reward is e ective in our case.
Terminal.
In the poisoning a acking problem, the number of allowed adding adversarial edges is constrained by the budget ∆ for the unnoticeable consideration. So in the poisoning reinforcement learning environment, once the agent adds T = ∆ edges, it stops taking actions. In terminal state s T , the poisoned graph G contains T more adversarial edges compared to the clean graph G.
State Representation
As mentioned above, the state s t contains the poisoned graph G t and injected nodes labels T A t at time t. To represent the nonEuclidean structure of the poisoned graph G t with vector e(G t ), the latent embedding e( i ) of the each node i in G t is rstly learned by struct2vec [11] using the discriminative information. en the state vector representation e(G t ) is obtained by aggregating the embedding of nodes as:
To represent the label of the injected nodes, we use the two layer neural networks to encode the T A t as e(T A t ). Note that for the notation compact and consistency consideration, e(s) represents embedding of the state, and e( a ) and e(T a ) are the embeddings of the node selected by action a and label selected by action a respectively in the following paper.
Hierarchical Q Network
In Q learning process, given the state s t and action a t , the actionvalue function Q(s t , a t ) is supposed to give the scores of current state and selected actions to guide the RL agent. However, as the action a is decomposed into three hierarchical actions {a (1) , a (2) , a (3) } for the e ciency searching consideration, it would be hard to directly design the Q(s t , a
t , a
t ) and apply one policy network to select hierarchical actions.
To overcome this problem, we adopt hierarchical deep Q networks Q = {Q (1) , Q (2) , Q (3) } which integrates three DQNs to model the Q values over the actions. Figure ( 2) illustrates the framework of selection action a t = {a (1) t , a (2) t , a (3) t )} at time t. e rst DQN Q (1) guides the policy to select a node from injected node set V A ; based on a (1) t , the second DQN Q (2) learns the policy to select a second node from the node set V , which completes an edge injection by connecting the two nodes. e third DQN Q (3) learns the policy to modify the label of the rst selected injected node. e agent rstly selects one node from the injected node set V A and calculate the Q value based on the action-value function Q (1) as:
where
2 } represents the trainable weights of the rst DQN and is the concatenation operation. e action-value function Q (1) estimates the Q value given the state and action. e greedy policy to select the action a (1) t based on optimal action-value function Q (1) * in eq. (12) is de ned as follows:
With the rst action a (1) t selected, the agent picks the second action a (2) t hierarchically based on Q (2) as:
2 } is the trainable weights.
e action value function Q (2) scores the state, and the action a 
t . e greedy policy to make the second action a (2) t with the optimal Q (2) * in eq. (14) is de ned as follows:
t , a; θ (2) ); (15) Note that the agent only modi es the label of the selected injected node a (1) t , the action-value function for the third action is not related to the action a (2) t .
e action-value function Q (3) is de ned as follows:
2 } represents the trainable weights in Q (3) . e action value function Q (3) models the score of changing the label of the injected node a (1) t . e greedy policy to such action is de ned as follows:
Training Algorithm
To train the proposed hierarchy DQNs Q = {Q (1) , Q (2) , Q (3) } and the graph embedding method structure2vec, we use the experience replay technique with memory bu er M. e high level idea is simulating the selection process to generate training data, which are stored in memory bu er, during the reinforcement learning training process. During training, the experience (s, a, s ) where a = {a (1) , a (2) , a (3) } is drawn uniformly at random from the stored memory bu er M. e Q-learning loss function is similar to [24] as:
whereQ represents target action-value function and its parameters θ − are updated with θ every C steps. To improve the stability of the algorithm, we clip the error term between −1 and +1. e agent adopts ϵ-greedy policy that select a random action with probability ϵ. e overall training framework is summarized in Algorithm 1. Set s t +1 = {s t , a In the proposed model, we use two layer multi-layer perceptrons to implement all the trainable parameters θ in action-value functions Q (1) , Q (2) , Q (3) and structure2vec. Actually, more complex deep neural networks could replace the models outlined here. We leave exploring feasible deep neural networks as a future direction.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we introduce the experiment se ing including baseline datasets and comparing poisoning a ack methods. Moreover, we conduct experiments and present results to answer the following research questions: (RQ1) Can the NIPA e ectively poison the graph data via node injection? (RQ2) Whether the poisoned graph remains the key statistics a er the poison a ack? (RQ3) How the proposed framework performances under di erent scenarios? Next, we rst introduce the experimental se ings followed by experimental results to answer the three questions.
Experiment Setup

Datasets.
We conduct experiments on three widely used benchmark datasets for node classi cation, which include CORA-ML [7, 22] , CITESEER [15] and DBLP [25] . Following [36] , we only consider the largest connected component (LCC) of each graph data.
e statistics for the datasets are summarized in Table 1 . For each dataset, we randomly split the nodes into (20%) labeled nodes for training procedure and (80%) unlabeled nodes as test set to evaluate the model. e labeled nodes are further equally split into training and validation sets. We perform the random split ve times and report averaged results.
Baseline
Methods. ough there are several adversarial a ack algorithms on graphs such as Ne ack [35] and RL-S2v [12] , most of them are developed for manipulating links among existing nodes in graph, which cannot be easily modi ed in our a acking se ing for node injection a ack. us, we don't compare with them. Since node injection a ack on graphs is a novel task, there are very few baselines we can compare with. We select following four baselines, with two from classical graph generation models, one by applying the technique of fast gradient a ack and a variant of NIPA.
• Random A ack: e a acker A rst adds adversarial edges between the injected nodes according to Erdos-Renyi model [14] G(V A , p), where the probability p = 2|E | |V | 2 is the average degree of the clean graph G(V , E) to make sure the density of the injected graph G A is similar to the clean graph. e a acker then randomly add adversarial edges connecting the injected graph G A and clean graph G until the budget ∆ is used ups.
• Preferential a ack [3] : e a acker A iteratively adds the adversarial edges according to preferential a achment mechanism. e probability of connecting the injected node i ∈ V A to the other node j ∈ |V ∪ V A | is proportional to the node degrees.
e number of adversarial edges is constrained by the budget ∆.
• Fast Gradient A ack(FGA) [10] : Gradient based methods are designed to a ack the graph data by perturbing the gradients. In FGA, the a acker A removes/adds the adversarial edges guided by edge gradient.
• NIPA-w/o: is is a variant of the proposed framework NIPA where we don't optimize w.r.t the label of fake nodes, i.e., the labels of the fake nodes are randomly assigned.
e Fast Gradient A ack(FGA) [10] is not directly applicable in injection poisoning se ing, since the injected nodes are isolated at the beginning and would be ltered out by graph classi er. Here we modify the FGA for fair comparison. e FGA method is performed on the graph poisoned by preferential a ack. A er calculating the gradient ∇ i j L GC N with i ∈ V A and j ∈ V , the a ack A adding/remove the adversarial edges between ( i , j ) according to the largest positive/negative gradient. e a ack only add and remove one feasible adversarial edge are each iteration so that the number of the adversarial edges is still constrained by budget ∆.
e a acker is allowed to perform 20*∆ times modi cations in total suggested by [10] .
Attack Performance Comparison
To answer RQ1, we evaluate how the node classi cation accuracy degrades on the poisoned graph compared with the performance on the clean graph. e larger decrease the performance is on the poisoned graph, the more e ective the a ack is.
Node Classi cation on Clean Graph As the Ne ack [35] points out that "poisoning a acks are in general harder and match be er the transductive learning scenario", we follow the same poisoning transductive se ing in this paper. e parameters of GCN are 1). We report the averaged node classication accuracy over ve runs in Table. 3 to present the GCN node classi cation accuracy on clean graph. Note that if the poisoning nodes are injected with the budget ∆ = 0, such isolated nodes would be ltered out by GCN and the classi cation results remain the same as in Table. 3. Node Classi cation on Poisoned Graph In poisoning a acking process, the a acking budget ∆ which controls the number of added adversarial edges is one important factor. On the one hand, if the budget is limited, eg., ∆ < |V A |, then at least |V A | − ∆ injected nodes are isolated. Clearly, isolated nodes have no e ect on the label prediction as they are not really injected into the environment. On the other hand, if the budget is large, the density of the injected graph is di erent from the clean graph and such injected nodes might be detected by the defense methods. Here, to make the poisoned graph has the similar density with the clean graph and simulates the real world poisoning a acking scenario, we set ∆ = r * |V | * de (V ) where r is the injected nodes ratio compared to the clean graph and de (V ) is the average degree of the clean graph G. e injected nodes number is |V A | = r * |V |. We will evaluate how e ective the a ack is when the injected nodes can have di erent number of degrees in Section 5.4.1. To have comprehensive comparisons of the methods, we vary r as r = {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10}. We don't set r > 0.10 since we believe that too much injected nodes could be easily noticed in real-world scenarios. For the same unnoticeable consideration, the feature of the injected nodes is designed to be similar to that of the clean node features. For each injected node, we calculate the mean of the features asX and apply the Gaussian noise N (0, 1) on the averaged featuresX .
e features of the injected node are similar to the features in clean graph. We leave the generation of node features as future work. As the other baselines method could not modi es the adversarial labels of the injected nodes, we also provide the variant model NIPA-w/o which doesn't manipulate the adversarial labels for fair comparison. e adversarial labels are randomly generated within |L| for the baseline methods. In both NIPA and NIPA-w/o, we set the discount factor γ = 0.9 and the injected nodes V A are only appear in training phase in all of the methods.
e averaged results with standard deviation for all methods are reported in Table 2. From Table 3 and 2, we could observe that (1) In all a acking methods, more injected nodes could be er reduce the node classi cation accuracy, which satisfy our expectation. (2) Compared with Random and Preferential a ack, FGA is relatively more e ective in a acking the graph, though the performance gap is marginal. is is because random a ack and preferential a ack don't learn information from the clean graph and just insert fake nodes following prede ned rule.
us, both of the methods are not as e ective as FGA which tries to inject nodes through a way to decrease the performance. (3) e proposed framework outperforms the other methods. In particular, both FGA and NIPA are optimization based approach while NIPA signi cantly outperforms FGA, which implies the e ectiveness of the proposed framework by designing hierarchical deep reinformcent learning to solve the decision making optimization problem. (4) NIPA out performances NIPA-w/o, which shows the necessity of optimizing w.r.t to labels for node injection a ack.
Key Statistics of the Poisoned Graphs
To answer RQ2, we analyze some key statistics of the poisoned graphs, which helps us to understand the a acking behaviors. One desired property of the poisoning graph is that the poisoned graph has similar graph statistics to the clean graph. We use the same graph statistics as that used in [8] to measure the poisoned graphs for the three datasets. e results are reported in Table 4 . It could be concluded from the graph statistics that (1) Poisoned graph has very similar graph distribution to the clean graph. For example, the similar exponent of the power law distribution in graph indicates that the poisoned graph and the clean graph shares the similar distribution. (2) More injected nodes would make the poisoning a ack process noticeable. e results show that with the increase of r , the poisoned graph becomes more and more diverse from the origin graph. (3) e number of triangles increases, which shows that the a ack not just simply connect fake nodes to other nodes, but also connect in a way to form triangles so each connection could a ects more nodes.
Attack E ects Under Di erent Scenarios
In this subsection, we conduct experiments to answer RQ3, i.e., how e ective the a ack by NIPA is under di erent scenarios.
Average Degrees of Injected Nodes.
As we discussed that the budget ∆ = r * |V | * deg( A ) is essential to the poisoning a ack, we investigate the node classi cation accuracy by varying the average degree of injected nodes as deg( A ) = {3, . . . 10}. e experiment results when r = 0.1 and r = 0.2 on CITESEER and CORA are shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , respectively. From the gures, we observe that as the increase of the average degree of the injected nodes, the node classi cation accuracy decrease sharply, which satis es our expectation because the more links a fake node can have, the more likely it can poison the graph. We further investigate how the proposed framework works under di erent sparsity of the network. Without loss of generality, we set average degree of injected node as the average degree of the real node. To simulate the sparsity of the network, we randomly remove S p = {0, 10%, . . . , 90%} edges from the original graph. e results with r = 0.01 and r = 0.02 on CITSEER and CORA are shown in Fig.4 . e results show that as the graph becomes more spare, the proposed framework is more e ective in a acking the graph. is is because as the graph becomes more sparse, each node in the clean graph has less neighbors, which makes the it easier for fake nodes to change the labels of unlabeled nodes. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a novel problem of non-target graph poisoning a ack via node injection. We propose NIPA a deep reinforcement learning based method to simulate the a ack process and manipulate the adversarial edges and labels for the injected nodes. Speci cally, we design reward function and hierarchy DQNs to be er communicate with the reinforcement learning environment and perform the poisoning a ack. Experimental results on node classi cation demonstrate the e ectiveness of the proposed framework for poisoning the graph. e poisoned graph has very similar properties as the original clean graph such as gini coe cient and distribution entropy. Further experiments are conducted to understand how the proposed framework works under di erent scenarios such as very sparse graph. ere are several interesting directions need further investigation. First, in this paper, we use mean values of node features as the feature of fake nodes. We would like to extend the proposed model for simultaneously generate features of fake nodes. Second, we would like to extend the proposed framework on more complicated graph data such as heterogeneous information network and dynamic network.
